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RIGID LEGAL THEORIES, WITH CONTRACTUAL
ILLUSTRATIONS
Introduction
Theories, in the field of the lawyer's profession, are mental
tools. They help him to carve the prophecy which he gives in
the form of paid advice, and he must know how to wield
them or shield against them in the conflict of trial. Therefore
the reader must not skitter away from the word "theories," if
the law is his field. An intelligent workman must not only
know all of his tools, but he must know their strength and
their weakness, their sharpness and their dullness, their
limits of fitness and unfitness. Changing the simile, every
scrap of information about legal theories is grist for the
lawyer's mill. Try to wade through the introduction and we
will bring you down to present problems.
Now it happens that a theory, when once evolved and
voiced as a product of past experience or empirical foresight, is very prone to go a little crazy. Having been born
of a particular set of thoughts and experiences, the theory
gets a delusion of grandeur and tries to cover everything
within apparent reach. Over two thousand years ago, a "lawof-nature" theory was developed in China, taking shape
under the leadership of Lao-tze, Mencius and Mih and culminating under Chuangtze. The theory was based upon the
observation that primitive people in a state of nature were
free of many worries and complexities which were present
in the current civilization. This theory then decided that a
prehistoric state of nature was a state of bliss, and hence
developed a mania for the utter abolition of all current law
and customs. A similar theory, similarly puffed into an idol,
has appeared periodically in most legal systems. The dreamy
Rousseau, frustrated and abashed by social complexities,
discovered it anew just prior to the French Revolution, and
a clumsy attempt to put it to work was made in the abortive
communistic experiment of the subsequent revolutionists.
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When some early common law theories were crystalizing,
there was a broad concept of the sanctity and permanency
of titles to property. In accord with this concept there was
a theory that a thief or a finder of personal property other
than money, having no title, could not be the means of
creating a valid title in his innocent transferee. Instruments
of mercantile credit, such as promissory notes, were deemed
similar to or a species of personal property, and hence within
the theory. Now it happened that merchants found that
their greatest convenience was not suited by this application
of the theory. By custom among them, a note in a certain
form and payable or indorsed in blank or to bearer was
deemed quasi-money) and a hief or a finder thereof was
deemed able to pass, a perfect title .to a bona fide purchaser
for value, ctitting off the rights bf the loser. For"centuries
'the rigid and all-reaching common law theory stood adamant
against the custom of merchants and the needs of a newly
developed commercial world. Finally, iihder the influence
of a.new broad theory or method of general approach known
as philosophical jurisprudefice, the barriers of crystalized
conceptualism were battered down by a series of judicial
decisions, ind the law merchant entered the common law.
During the 1800's, the Anglo-American legal system again
saw a: general domination of the desire for stability, crystalization and absolute legal concepts and rules. Whether a
theory was one of broad approach or one in the form of a
rule dealing with a special.type of fact problem, there was
*a general desire of judges, lawyers, legislators and legal
thinkers to have it cast in absolute and immutable form.
Some sought to find the concepts and rules unfolded in history, same sought to create them by the sheer mental exercise of philosophy, and some sought to discover them by
analysis, but all agreed that when they were found or created
they should stand as the firmly fixed lares and penates of our
legal hearth. The opinionated Jeremy Bentham declared
that judges should apply the law as they found it laid down,
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without personal reflection or discretion, and he offered to
draw a perfect perpetual constitution and code of laws for
any nation on the face of the earth. The constitution of
South Carolina was the only practical product of the offer.
This dominant juristic -attitude has been called the Jurisprudence of Conceptions.
One of the favorite forms of this outlook of the 1800's
was the evidentiary rule. As corollaries to general rules,
there were evolved various rules devoted to various fact
situations which might bring the general rule into issue;
and each special rule declared that whenever its kind of
fact appeared it should always and automatically prove that
the general rule was (or was not) fulfilled.
The "Quotation" Rule
For example, there had been worked out our modern general rule that for a communication to be tagged as an "offer" it must manifest a proposition final in form, not merely
tentative, to Which the communicator is willing to be bound,
without a further chance to reconsider or dicker, the moment the other party assents. In connection with that proposition, it was observed that when a communication takes
the form of a letter or telegram listing prices in the words
"we quote you," it was normally intended and understood
to manifest a tentative or negotiating state of mind. From
this observation, there was precipitated a sort of evidentiary
rule that the words "we quote you" or their equivalent always, as a matter of law, are intended to manifest a negotiating state of mind, and the receiver of those words is not
justified in being misled into believing anything else. By
this rule, the words have a constant and automatic legal
implication, regardless of context or surrounding circumstances.'
1 See: Johnston Bros. v. Rogers Bros., 30 Ont. 150 (1899); Boyer & Co. v.
Duke, 2 Ir. Rep. 617 (1905) ; Little v. Hanbury, 14 B. C. R. 18 (1908) ; Harvey v.
Facey [1893] A. C. 552; Knight v. Cooley, 34 Iowa 218 (1872); Smith v. Gowdy,
8 Allen (Mass.) 566 (1864); Nebraska Seed Co. v. Harsh, 98 Neb. 89 (1915);
Courteen Seed Co. v. Abraham, 129 Ore. 427 (1929).

RIGID LEGAL THEORIES

In some of the cases last cited, the word "quote" was not
used, the court indicating that the evidentiary rule applies
to any communication which in fact is a quotation. The
jurisprudence of conceptions, whose products are still very
much with us, is a ready mark for the bloating expansion
of theories. It is perfectly obvious that the conceptual proposition about quotations is capable of a reductio ,ad absurdum. Suppose A. should write to B.: "I want the price
at which you will sell me barrels of X-flour in carload lots,
and any quotation you give me is understood to be an offer
which, upon my acceptance, will immediately create a binding contract." If B. sends back a quotation, no court could
hold otherwise than that B. had manifested an offering state
of mind. In trying to avoid judicial caprice and discretion,
some courts stated the evidentiary rule of quotations in a
form too absolute for any of them if actually put to the test.
It seems a proper limit to state that a communication
carrying a quotation may or may not manifest an offering
state of mind, and it is a question of fact, aided by the context and surrounding circumstances, as to what reasonable
belief on the part of the receiver of the communication is
justified. The decision in Harvey v. Facey 2 has been subjected to the criticism that the quotation of price was not
the first communication, but was sent in response to a telegram which seemed to give plain notice that an offer, a manifestation of a final state of mind, was desired.
There is a Massachusetts case, also, in which there appears to be a complete disregard of the fact that a quotation
was made in response to an inquiry and not as the initial
move. 4 The plaintiff wired, "How much corn will you sell,
and price." The defendant wired in reply, "1,000 cases,
$1.15, open one week." Then the plaintiff wired, "Sold
corn," and requested delivery. The court held that this did
2 Op. cit. supra note 1.
3 See: 45 Can. L. J. (N. S.) 617; 1 CAN. BAR REv. 392, 398, 403, 713.
4 Lincoln v. Erie Preserving Co., 132 Mass. 129 (1882).
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not complete a contract because the defendant's wire was
a quotation and so, automatically, not an offer. It-is submitted that the words "will you sell," in the plaintiff's first
wire, put the defendant upon notice that he was expected to
make an offer, and that unless he made the contrary plain
his reply would be taken to manifest a final state of mind.
The reply certainly looked final, and the words "open one
week" do not make sense unless attached to an offer;, a set
lifetime has no meaning or value in a proposition which is
tentative and negotiatory.
Some courts have seen that the evidentiary rule as to "we
quote" is improper and unfair in its form as an absolute
concept; they have declined to let the process of thinking
on and evaluating fact problems be replaced by mathematical molds into which facts volens nolens must be crammed.
For example, in Fairmount Glass Works v. Cruden-Martin
Co.' the court said:
"But each case must turn largely upon the language there used. In
this case we think there was more than a quotation of prices, although
appellant's letter uses the word 'quote' in stating the prices given.
The true meaning of the correspondence must be determined by reading it as a whole." 6

The "Counter-Offer" Rule
Another example of rule-worship leading to an oversweeping rigidity appears in some decisions concerning the
effect of a counter-offer as a rejection.
A basic proposition in the common law prescribed that
a rejection by an offeree kills the offer, even though its
natural span of life (a time set or a reasonable time) has
not yet run; thereafter there is nothing left to which an
acceptance may attach. This starting point was fair enough;
it was based upon the observation that an offeror who receives a rejection is entitled to believe that the offer is dead
and he may go ahead with his plans free of any duty of revo5
6

106 Ky. 659, 51 S. W. 196 (1899).
See, also, Texas Co. v. American Trade Co., 272 Fed. 670 (1921).
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cation. But after a time, chiefly in the 1800's, this theory was
expanded to include the proposition that a counter-offer is
always an implied rejection. 7 Another expansion followed
in the form of a rule that a conditional or modified acceptance is equivalent to a counter-offer, and hence is an implied
rejection. These rules contain a fundamental wisdom, but
the fault lies in the habit, established under the dominance
of the jurisprudence of conceptions, of stating them in a
rigidly absolute and unqualified form, with the accent so
strongly on the rule as to tend to subordinate the details
of a particular fact problem.
Now it seems plain that an offeree may desire to hang
onto the offer while he sends out an inquiry as to possible
different terms, and may make this clear so that the offeror
is not justified in being led into a belief that the offer has
been killed.' It is likely that most courts would agree on this
limit, or explanation, for the general "counter-offer" rule.
The danger, however, lies in the habit of stating the bald
rule that a counter-offer is an automatic rejection. Such a
statement is likely to prevent a searching of the mind for
limitations or shadings. The human mind disgorges its contents only when prodded by stimuli. If a stimulus is partial
and fragmentary, it will bring forth only parts and fragments of the possible memories of law and observation of
facts. The commonest sin of legal thinking, by students or
lawyers, is omission, produced by an inherent and eager
tendency to leap at prompt and final conclusions on the first
body of observed materials.
Therefore it would seem much safer, protecting the legal
thinker against his own unwise tendency, always to state
the rule of implied rejection somewhat in this fashion:
"An offeree may reject the offer or he may hold it while he
makes an inquiry; a counter-offer or a conditional accept7 See the leading case of Hyde v. Wrench, 3 Beav. 334 (1840).
"8 The leading case on this proposition is Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. D.

346 (188D).
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ance may imply a rejection, but not if it makes reasonably
clear an intention of the offeree to hold onto the offer." 9
The advantage of this form is that it puts both possibilities
immediately before the reciter of the rule, and causes him to
go through a fairly complete and two-sided process of perception and memory before he attempts a conclusion. In
this paper we have space for only a few sample situations,
but the reader can rest assured that they are typical of
hundreds of problems covering all divisions of the legal field.
It is hoped that one plain lesson may be deduced; learn
your rules and use them in a form which states the alternatives. Learn legal propositions in groupings, wherever
possible, so that two or more rules pertinent to an issue
join in proddingand broadening the perceptions and help
to point out the full problem of fact in connection with the
rules which are aids to thinking.
Promises Without Consideration
Probably the most familiar and yet timely example of
the difficulty flowing from an overly rigid concept or theory
is found in the rule that an unsealed promise must be supported by consideration. This broad proposition was crystalized into its details by the formation of two fundamental
tests. First, the purported consideration must fulfill an "intent element"; it must be that which the manifested intent
of the promisor wanted as the price of the promise, and
it must have been given by one who then and there knew
of and intended thereby to purchase the promise. Second,
the purported consideration must fulfill a "detrimentbenefit element"; it must be something which the giver
legally did not have to give and which the receiver had no
legal right to insist upon. This statement is brief, but it
9 See the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, section 38. which says: "A counteroffer by the offeree, relating to the same matter as the original offer, is a rejection of the original offer, unless the offeree at the same time states in express
terms that he is still keeping the original offer under advisement."
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summarizes a concept which the juristic attitude dominant
in the 1800's took to be fairly absolute, rigid and selfsufficient.
But this, concept was scarcely formulated before it began to run into difficulties. Fact situations arose wherein
certain courts felt that, in spite of total or partial failure
of compliance with the set rule of consideration, the promisor in fairness ought to be held to his promise and the
promisee ex aequo et bono ought to recover. As early as
1849, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts voiced a
yearning for the irrevocability, in some circumstances, of a
promise to keep an offer open for a set time.1" The court
said:
"Highly respectable authors regard it as inconsistent with the plain
principles of equity, that a person, who has been induced to rely on
such an engagement, should have no remedy in case of disappointment.
But whether wisely and equitably or not, the common law unyieldingly
insists upon a consideration, or a paper with a seal attached."

The court might yearn, but the rising tide of the jurisprudence of conceptions was too strong to permit any admission of possible change.
More recently, there have been two types of attempts to
break through the old concept and to make irrevocable an
offer whose acceptance takes considerable time when a substantial start on the acceptance causes the offeree to undergo a substantial change of position. One view attempts by
fiction to find compliance with the old rules; a collateral
option contract may be found,11 or there is an implied immediate promissory acceptance of which the further acts
of the offeree are deemed mere performance. A second view
sets out a frank noncompliance with the rules of consideration and a frank new rule that certain offers, admittedly un10 The Boston & Maine R. R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224 (1849).
11 See the famous Wilshire case, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902), and

various discussions thereof.
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sealed and lacking consideration, are irrevocable because
of the demands of justice and fair dealing.12
Closely parallel to the situation of "irrevocable" offers,
we find a group of cases concerning promises which are
final in form, not merely tentative offers, and yet are unsealed and fail to comply strictly with one or the other of
the two classic tests of valid consideration. 8 The charitable
subscription cases have produced the largest variety of
judicial struggles hereon," and the two fundamental "attitudes of stability and flexibility of rules are quite plainly
voiced by the majority and dissenting opinions in Tke Allegkany College case. 5 Mr. Chief Justice Cardozo, speaking
for the majority, pointed out that most of the arguments by
which courts have purported to find classic consideration
for a charitable subscription are fictitious, and he voiced the
very frank belief that the rigid elements which form the
classic rule or test are breaking down to admit the legal
validity of a promise which has caused the promisee to rely
on it and substantially change his position. In opposition,
Mr. Justice Kellogg, writing for the minority and conservatively respectful of the classic rigid rule, said:
"I can see no ground for the suggestion that the ancient rule which
makes consideration necessary to the formation of every contract is in
danger of effacement through any decisions of this court. To me that
is a cause for gratulation rather than regret."

Obviously, the dissent does not understand the majority
suggestion, for Mr. Chief Justice Cardozo had no desire
for the "effacement" of the classic rule,--in fact, he actually used the classic rule and declared it fulfilled by the facts
of the case before him. The Chief Justice merely desired to
12

See Professor McGovney's article, "Irrevocable Offers." in 27 HAnv. L.

REv. 644.
Is Most

readers probably remember being introduced to this problem by
the cases of Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845), and flevecmon v. Shaw, 69
Md. 199, 14 AUt. 464 (1888).
14 See these subscription cases classified in 18 CAL. L. R-v. 314, in an
article by C. H. Matthews.
15 Alleghany College v. National Chatauqua Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E.
173 (1927).
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soften and take the rigidity out of the rule in order to allow
justice to a misled promisee in a limited group of instances,
to make an "exception" as he plainly stated.
It has been noted that some people persist in misunderstanding both Justice Cardozo and Dean Pound. Those
steeped in the tradition of the jurisprudence of conceptions,
trained in the property-based writings of Professor Gray,
think that Cardozo and his ilk are dangerously revolutionary. Those who have leaped into the unleashed Non-Euclidean torrent of Jerome Frank et al., and become a bit drunk
on the waters thereof, insist that Dean Pound is a stodgy
conservative who hides a Benthamite heart beneath his coat
of sociological jurisprudence. These two groups of critics
prove our present thesis that theories are inherently prone
to go a little crazy. Those who have found a need for flexibility and change get to the point where they want to throw
the anchors overboard and trust the legal ship to the unfettered winds of "modem" thinking. Those who see a need
for safeguards and stability are likely to set all anchors
firmly and let the legal ship become barnacled and decayed.
Of course, the truth of the matter is that both Cardozo and
Pound are rarely keen men who understand full well the
constant legal conflict of the desire for stability and the
need for change. The reason why they irritate the "ultras"
is that they have been able to keep their balance.
We might go on with further illustrations of judicial alleviation of the classic rules of consideration. It is not our
purpose, however, to pile up cases. The exceptions to the
detriment element, in its aspect of the "doing what you are
bound to do" doctrine, have been laid out in casebooks and
texts, and should be studied; they give some excellent illustrations of both the jurisprudence of conceptions and a variety of judicial devices for dodging the rigidity of those conceptions.
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Conclusion
Our main purpose is to indicate that theories and ideas,
whether on the side of stability or of flexibility, are tainted
with the human tendency toward absolutism and superlatives. They like to cover everything in sight, and are susceptible to a delusion of grandeur. Just as we find a common desire to put a tag on the "greatest" or the "worst"
President, the "finest" or the "most untasty" culinary dish,
or the "greatest" All-American full-back, so we also find
a tendency to the superlative in legal or governmental theories and ideas.
Finally, an appreciation of our thesis has a practical value
to the lawyer, apart from his own mental balance. This writer has had two recent successes with it, by way of proof.
In one case he deprecated the over-worship of flexibility,
and pointed out the value of a basic stability which protects
judges and lawyers against their own hunches and caprice,
in order to secure the sustaining of a demurrer. In the other
case he was able, in an argument on the merits, to weaken
the broad statements in a line of cases by showing that they
were born in the very midst of the jurisprudence of conceptions, and to secure a recognition of limits and variants to
the former sweeping proposition.
Jurisprudence, and an appreciation of the thoughts and
tendencies which have shaped it, are not dead stuff to be
relegated to queer old book-scholars. They are alive, practical, useful tools for the practitioner. They give meaning and
depth to propositions found in decisions, statutes and texts.
The brief illustrations here given from case law can be found
duplicated in every branch or subject. It is for those who
look for and see them to give to past and present authorities
their richest and keenest use before the courts.
Edwin W. Hadley.
Northeastern University, School of Law.

